The Chinese government persisted with the contention that the mission of the B-29 had been one of espionage. It cited such “damning” evidence as the fact that the crew wore U.S. military uniforms.

Naturally, this point was quickly picked up by the Soviet delegate to the U.N., but was quickly ridiculed by the U.S. delegate as no proof at all. It was pointed out that it would be foolhardy for a Caucasian to attempt espionage in an Oriental country while dressed in a U.S. military uniform — hardly a worthy disguise.

Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of The United Nations, traveled to Peking in January of 1955 for a series of meetings with Chou En lai, Prime Minister of The Peoples Republic of China. This was in accordance with a mandate given the Secretary General by the General Assembly.

In the first meeting Dag Hammarskjold informed Chou of the position of The General Assembly of The United Nations in the matter of the detainment and sentencing of the eleven crew members of the B-29. He stated that, after viewing the evidence, he and the members of the Assembly felt that justice had not been served. He said that it was their firm belief that the B-29 was under orders of the U.N. Command to conduct a leaflet dropping mission on the night of January 12, 1953 over six specified targets in North Korea. He also stated that general orders prohibited the aircraft from violating the Chinese-Korean border.

Pointing out that the leaflet mission was a legitimate operation of the Korean conflict, he said that the crew members wore uniforms of the United States Air Force.

Regarding the tracking of the plane by U.N. ground radar, the Secretary General explained that when the craft was in the vicinity of Souchon, one of the designated targets in North Korea, it was seen to be attacked by twelve fighters. He said that a few minutes later ground radio stations picked up a distress signal from the B-29 indicating that it had incurred heavy damage and was being abandoned. He stated that according to normal procedures following the loss of an aircraft, routine missing-in-action casualty reports were issued.

Secretary Hammarskjold then stated that though the belief was that the men had parachuted into North Korea, if they did drop beyond the Yalu River into China, the did so “under the gravest stress of force majeure.”

He pointed out further that the evidence which he had personally investigated clearly showed that the equipment on the aircraft and crew was standard for operations in North Korea. This included elaborate survival equipment not normally carried on aircraft other than those of The United States.

Interestingly, Secretary Hammarskjold made a statement to the effect that even if the mission had included a reconnaissance element, this was activity recognized as distinct from espionage by all authorities on international law, including Soviet writers.

The Secretary General concluded by stating that he was not meeting with the Prime Minister simply because The General Assembly had requested that he attempt to gain the release of the men, nor because of his own belief that the men were innocent. He said that he had come because of his concern that this incident, which might seem insignificant in itself, could be a key element in avoiding further friction.

After making the statements of welcome and respect as the Secretary General had done and as are dictated by protocol, Prime Minister Chou began his role by stating that The General Assembly of The United Nations had no authority over The Chinese Government. He then said that if The Secretary General accepted the position that the discussion did not imply acceptance of the United Nations' resolution by the Chinese, he (Chou) would be willing to continue with the subject of the B-29 crew.

He insisted that international law did not apply in this case because the men were captured as spies inside China.

On the matter of the wearing of military uniforms by the crew, Chou said that they did this to use the war in Korea as a cover for their acts of espionage against China. Chou discussed the Chinese policy of leniency toward prisoners who confessed their guilt and exhibited good behavior.

In his part of the discussion The Prime Minister took the opportunity to launch into several irrelevant matters such as China's non-membership in The U.N. and the dispute over Taiwan.

Following Chou's presentation, The Secretary General replied briefly that nothing Chou had said had shaken his belief that the eleven B-29 crewmen were innocent.

The discussions lasted through four sessions, each on a separate day, as each man expressed his views and each refuted the other's claims. It must be said that while Secretary Hammarskjold was able to produce valid evidence and sound arguments, Chou En-lai's presentation was weak and without substance, being based mostly on conjecture and supposition.

Just recently, as I read a transcript of these meetings, one particular point which interested me was Chou's declaration that my own presence on the plane as instructor pilot was further proof that the intended mission was espionage! He applied the same reasoning to account for the extra radar operator and Colonel Arnold.

Chou made another comment which caught my attention. He said they had confessions. There were no “confessions” regarding flying into China to conduct acts of espionage or even “confessions” to “criminal violations of Chinese territorial air,” as my interrogators phrased it.

At the conclusion of the conference, Chou presented The Secretary General with the invitations for the families of the prisoners to visit them in China. He also gave Dag Hammarskjold documents and photographs attesting to our good health. The photographs were those that had been taken while we were being “examined” by doctors during a “propaganda party.”

Of course, nothing was resolved during the meetings because the Chinese had already formulated their plan and were sticking with it. Mao and his band of merry men had decided to stage the trial and sentence us regardless of the facts. We were political pawns.

1. Much of the information pertaining to the United Nations was obtained from minutes of the UN meetings and from notes concerning meetings between Dag Hammarskjold and Chou En-lai.