Although U.S. leaders suspected that many other nations desired to break the U.S. monopoly on atomic weapons, it did not know the degree of importance the USSR placed on acquiring this new weapon. Immediately after the U.S. use of two atomic weapons to force Japan’s surrender, Stalin made Soviet atomic weapon development and creation of a strategic bomber force the USSR’s top two priorities for its post-WW II military.

Unbeknownst to the U.S., the USSR had built an impressive and far-reaching web of spies dedicated to learn about U.S. atomic development during the war. The Soviet effort was aided by poor U.S. security practices and atomic scientists who turned against the use of atomic energy as a weapon. These same scientists did not perceive the Soviet Union or Communism as a threat to world peace. The Soviets also made good use of German expertise in the form of POWs and scientists captured during and after WW II. These scientists and captured program information were incorporated into indigenous Soviet efforts. (11)

Growing Soviet Strength:

The U.S. was taken by surprise when the USSR exploded its first nuclear device (named Joe 1 by the Soviets) on 19 August 1949 at Semipalatinsk. (12) The first Soviet detonation came 3 to 5 years sooner than national security and military intelligence experts had predicted. In fact, the first indication of the Soviet atomic explosion was detected by newly-developed reconnaissance WB-29 “Sniffer” aircraft designed to detect signs of nuclear fallout through the collection of radiation particles in the air. (13) This Soviet “surprise” acquisition of atomic weapons created grave implications for the U.S. Now, our primary adversary had a devastating weapon to use against us.

Combined with the display of the first Soviet long-range, intercontinental Tupelov (Tu)-4 (BULL) bomber in August 1947 at the Tushino airfield (near Moscow), the USSR now also had the means by which to deliver a possible atomic attack. (14) The Tu-4’s display in 1947 was meant to show the world the USSR’s strategic power. (15) Now, more than ever, U.S. intelligence had to determine how many atomic weapons and bombers the USSR was producing and where they would strike from should they be used. This was made all the more difficult by the Soviet Union’s totalitarian government, sealed borders, closed society and vast, unknown landmass.

As shocking as the USSR’s detonation of its first atomic weapons was, the Chinese Communist victory over the Nationalist forces in autumn 1949 came as an even bigger surprise to Americans. In October, Mao Tse-tung consolidated his hold over the mainland and established the People’s Republic of China. (16) While President Truman and the U.S. military knew the nationalists were losing the conflict, the loss of China came at a critical juncture and as a great shock to the American public. Immediate calls for explanations and the specter of Communist domination of the world left U.S. leaders looking to the intelligence community for answers.

Suspicions were raised to a fever pitch with the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. President Truman perceived the North Korean invasion (with the implicit backing of the Soviets and People’s Republic of China) as the next step in a Communist plan for world domination. After immediately authorizing the use of U.S. airpower to slow down and halt the North Korean advance, the U.S. took advantage of the USSR boycott of the United Nations (UN) Security Council to force a UN vote to use military force to repel the invasion. (17) Knowing that the U.S. military was unprepared to engage in another conflict halfway around the world, and believing this a systematic step to engage U.S. forces while another (main) event could be launched to overrun Europe, Truman tried to limit the scope of the conflict in the Far East.

After Communist Chinese land forces joined in the conflict in November 1950, U.S. leaders became even more convinced the USSR might be ready to launch an attack against Western Europe–or even against the United States itself. The Central Intelligence Agency’s first director, Richard Bissell, recalled

In the early fifties....the threat of massive Soviet strategic bombing attacks on the United States received increasing attention from civilian and military planners. The main preoccupation was with the Soviet long-range bomber force and the threat it posed to North America as well as Europe. (18)

On 16 December 1950, President Truman issued a Proclamation of National Emergency and called numerous National Guard units to active duty. With the UN forces in retreat back down the Korean peninsula, President Truman asked General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to return to active duty as the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe, in overall command of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. It was hoped that these actions would force the Soviets to think twice about any invasion of Western Europe.

The demand on national intelligence increased dramatically with the increased threat posed by these, and other, Communist actions around the world (see Appendix 1 for Political/Military Event Timeline). Not only did national and military intelligence need to determine the depth and degree of the North Korean, Soviet and Communist Chinese forces in the Far East theater, but they had to leverage this mission against trying to understand and prepare for the even greater threat posed to the U.S. from the USSR and PRC.

With few intelligence resources available from which to gather much needed information about the USSR and its Communist allies, President Truman began to authorize overflights of the Soviet Union and other potential belligerents. This was the beginning of the concerted effort to use aerial reconnaissance to help solve specific intelligence problems. Of particular interest was the status of Soviet air forces in those regions of Siberia closest to the U.S. and in the maritime provinces closest to Korea, where American forces were engaged in combat. With memories of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor still fresh in the minds of American leaders, the ability to accurately forecast and gauge the Soviet Union’s ability to strike at the U.S. was paramount. The difficulty in doing this lay in determining what the U.S. really needed to know.

(11) Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1995), 374.
(12) Rhodes, 371.
(13) Richelson, 222.
(14) Paul Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 26.
(15) The Tupelov-4 bomber was an exact copy of the U.S. B-29 long-range bomber. Several B-29’s made emergency landings in the Soviet Union during WW II and were never returned despite U.S. requests. These were reverse-engineered by the Soviet aircraft industry.
(16) Walker, 345.
(17) The USSR was boycotting the UN Security Council because the Chinese seat was being occupied by a Nationalist Chinese representative versus a representative of the Communist People’s Republic of China.
(18) Walker

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