In addition to photography a comprehensive electronic intercept search was to be conducted for signals transmitted by Soviet radars. No specific frequencies or bands-to-search were suggested. Thus, the purpose of the mission was twofold: To determine whether the Soviets were establishing an airfield in the Islands capable of basing fighter aircraft and TU-4 bombers, and also to conduct an electronic signal search to determine whether they had established operating radar facilities in the Archipelago. To our flight crew, the briefed mission requirements were nothing more than a routine reconnaissance sortie. What made the requirement exceptional was the hazards of the high Arctic operational environment, and the fact that at the islands we would be almost 1,500 miles from Thule across the Arctic Ocean, with no place to land in the event of an emergency. In addition, we would be flying into an area where an unknown potential existed for hostile Soviet fighter attacks.

With the briefing in progress it became apparent the briefing personnel could tell us very little about what to expect. They had no information to impart other than the perceived possibility (rumors) of Soviet or air base installations. They had no information relative to the environmental hazards of the Islands, because the charts were based on nineteenth century information. There was no positive assurance that the location of the islands on the charts was accurate. Knowing that we would be invading and violating Soviet territory we were keenly interested if we would be encountering Soviet fighters. We realized that an encounter could result in being shot down. We knew that an RB-29 was shot down a few months before, therefore we were well aware of the risks involved. We asked about the possibilities of a rescue operation in the event we had an emergency and they replied honestly that rescue would not be possible. I then asked about a navy submarine contact, surveillance, or pickup. They said “forget it!” Ditching in arctic waters was not an option in my book. Following the briefing there was no question in our minds that if we had a problem we were strictly on our own. Good Luck! Weather over the Archipelago was a controlling factor from the photographic standpoint. We were briefed to inform those at Headquarters Strategic Air Command when we were in position at Thule and ready to fly the mission. SAC weather forecasters would attempt to forecast the best photographic weather conditions for our mission, and on that basis they would send us an execute order.

Following a rest period we took off for the air base at Goose Bay, Labrador. Following a ten hour flight, landing at Goose Bay, we serviced the aircraft, obtained some rest and waited for a Military Air Transport Service C-97 to join us. The C-97 was transporting our maintenance support team with our flyaway spare parts kit. Major Bernard Zimmerman, our non-rated squadron intelligence officer, assumed supervision of this team, and served as security control officer. He would be my ground representative while we were on the overflight mission.

Beginning with the start of preparation for our top secret mission, it was evident that every effort was made to conceal the details of the overflight objective. All orders and direction were given verbally. All knowledge of the many details of the mission were strictly on a “right to know” basis. Our squadron commander who requested that we volunteer for the mission, and assigned us to it, did not know of our ultimate objective, nor was there ever an indication that he knew before or after our overflight. Our letter orders revealed nothing that would show en-route bases or destination. All instructions, briefing, en-route procedures, destination, execution orders, etc., were give to the crew verbally.